 |
|
Eisenhower was in ill health for much of his tenure as president. In particular, a heart attack during the first term led many to realize that Vice-president Nixon might soon succeed to the presidency. It seems clear Eisenhower did not consider Nixon to be presidential timber. Personally, Eisenhower seemed to hold Nixon in an odd mix of contempt and esteem. As a politician, however, Eisenhower believed Nixon "had not grown" during the first term, and had not won over doubtful voters to his side.
In January of 1956, Eisenhower decided to ask Nixon to step down as vice-president for the second term, and to accept a cabinet position instead. Thus Nixon would be following the example of FDR's vice-president Henry Wallace, demoted to cabinet status at the time of the 1944 election. Ike tried to paint the move as an excellent career choice, since vice-presidents have few powers, but a post like Secretary of Defense could allow Nixon to demonstrate real leadership. Nixon decided to ignore Eisenhower's suggestion, leading Ike to delegate a top party leader to again ask Nixon to accept a cabinet post.
All these "suggestions" Nixon ignored, knowing that the public would view such a move as a demotion, a "dumping" of Nixon that would kill his political career by implying that Ike did not have confidence in Richard Nixon. Nixon aimed to become president, either by succeeding Ike if the president died or became disabled, or by running in 1960. A move into the cabinet would dash hopes for the presidency in either case.
 |
Finally Eisenhower told reporters that he had not chosen a running mate for 1956, and that he did not know whether Nixon wanted to run again or not. Nixon "must chart his own course," Eisenhower insisted. In other words, Ike would not ask Nixon to run with him, Nixon must ask Ike. Ike was probably disappointed when Nixon went through the motions of scheduling an appointment, and then telling the president he would like to run for the vice-presidency again in 1956.
Even still, whenever reporters asked the president if he favored Dick Nixon for vice-president in 1956, Eisenhower replied that since his own nomination would not be official until the August convention, it would be presumptuous of him to name a running mate. Such an answer was ridiculously evasive. Renomination of a vice-president with his president had been almost automatic in American history, if the vice-president wanted to run again. Ike clearly held strong reservations about Nixon, but could not bring himself to voice these feelings in public.
Eventually Harold Stassen (former governor of Minnesota, and Ike's top disarmament negotiator) approached Ike with results of a private poll showing that with Nixon on the ticket, Ike would win fewer votes than otherwise. With a strong running mate like Governor Chris Herter of Massachusetts, Stassen explained, Eisenhower would win 6% more votes than he would if running on an Eisenhower-Nixon ticket. Stassen asked permission to launch a "Herter for Vice-president" movement, and Ike tacitly agreed, provided his own name were not used.
 |
According to Nixon biographer Fawn Brodie, what Ike and Stassen had not counted on was Nixon's close working relationship with members of the Republican National Committee, as well as with members of Congress. Stassen was undoubtedly mortified to find that aside from the president of Johnson's Wax and a few other business leaders, no other prominent men joined in the Herter cause.
In fact, as a strong and promising movement the Herter for Vice-president boom lasted almost exactly 24 hours. The boom was only a boomlet. Twenty Republican members of Congress sent Stassen an angry telegram, telling him Nixon would be the nominee, period. The 20 men gave copies of the telegram to the press, to lend additional support to the embattled vice-president. Nixon would later reward several of these men for their loyalty. Congressman Melvin Laird would be Nixon's Secretary of Defense, while Gerald R. Ford would be Nixon's second vice-president.
Governor Herter at first expressed "complete surprise" at Stassen's boosting his name, and said he would do anything appropriate for the good of the Eisenhower campaign. The next day, however, Herter announced he personally would nominate Nixon at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco.
Stassen himself kept up the campaign for Herter for Vice-president. He opened a headquarters in Washington, and later a convention headquarters in San Francisco. U.S. New and World Reports said that Herter volunteers passed out "Ike and Chris" buttons in hotel lobbies in San Francisco, but that most delegates refused them. The magazine also showed a photo of an "Ike and Chris" poster featuring a photo of Governor Herter. The magazine concluded that the Ike and Chris movement was clearly a lost cause, because the national Republican Party had already ordered millions of Ike and Dick buttons.
 |
At the convention, Stassen tried to get an appointment to see Eisenhower, but was told that he could not see the president unless he agreed to nominate Nixon. Thus both Herter and Stassen made nominating speeches for Richard Nixon, and the convention's choice for V.P. was almost unanimous. One Republican delegate voted for the imaginary "John Smith," while 1,323 voted for Nixon.
Nixon was not yet out of the limelight, however. Given Eisenhower's poor health, the Democrats told voters to remember Nixon might well succeed to the presidency. While Nixon had the reputation of being a dirty political fighter with an instinct for the jugular, GOP leaders now announced there was a "new Nixon" who was more statesman-like. Candidate Adlai Stevenson countered that voters preferred men "who don't have to be changed." Stevenson added that Americans did not like Nixonland. Nixonland, according to the Democratic standard-bearer, was the world of "sly innuendo, the poison pen, the anonymous phone call, the hustling, pushing, shoving; the land of smash and grab and anything to win."
In his last speech of the campaign, many thought Stevenson crossed the line into tastelessness, when he said that despite the advances of medical science, if the Republicans won "Richard M. Nixon would probably be president within the next four years." Still, Stevenson probably was wise to play upon fears of Nixon. An election eve poll by the Gallup organization showed 76% of the voters had a positive image of Eisenhower, but only 45% had a positive image of Nixon.
|
For the political collector quite a few items document the 1956 Herter movement, including a number not illustrated here. Undoubtedly the most common item is the nice "Ike and Chris" tab, which is die-cut in the shape of an elephant. Several pinback buttons supported the touted Ike-Herter ticket as well. The "Stick with Dick" button is often misidentified as a 1960 Nixon button, when actually it is a 1956 item for use before and during the Republican National Convention.
 |
Perhaps the most interesting question raised by this whole story is why Stassen launched his ill-fated dump Nixon movement. One explanation sometimes advanced is based on the fact that Stassen had strong presidential ambitions himself. This explanation says that of all potential 1960 rivals, Stassen feared Nixon most of all, and thus sought to kill Nixon's career by advancing Herter's name. Author Fawn Brodie points out that Stassen had been out of the country negotiating disarmament treaties, and thus he was not up-to-date on the direction of current political winds.
Other explanations stress the large number of Republicans who did not want Nixon to again be elected vice-president. This group included not only Stassen but many members of the Eisenhower administration and probably Ike himself. Yet only Stassen was willing to stick his neck out if Eisenhower did not endorse the movement. Thus when 24 hours passed with no substantial Republican leader signing on to Stassen's plan, the fate of the scheme was sealed. Meanwhile Nixon's strongest supporters exerted pressure on Herter to nominate Nixon at the convention, and Herter finally agreed.
At any rate, the various "dumpings" of Nixon took their toll. Attempts to dump him from the Republican ticket in 1952 and 1956 were followed by rejection at the hands of the nation's voters in 1960 and California's voters in 1962. These public humiliations laid the foundation for a Nixon presidency in which the chief executive hoped to live out his term in splendid isolation, isolated from potential hurts at the hands of reporters or members of Congress. Nixon undoubtedly hoped to avoid another public humiliation as he ran for reelection in 1972, and communicated those desires to his aides. Thus there is probably a very real link between the "dump Nixon" movements of the 1950s and Watergate of the 1970s.
Source: U.S. News & World Reports, August 3, 10, and 31, 1956. Fawn Brodie, Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character (1981).
| © 1997 by Stephen Cresswell |