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In Korea, American postwar policy ran up against internal inconsistencies. President Truman had pledged (in the so-called Truman Doctrine) that America would help all peoples struggling to maintain their freedom from Communism. Yet since the North Korean aggressors were backed by both the Soviet Union and China, American foreign policy makers had to decide just what kind of war we were willing to fight to save South Korea.
In the first document printed below, a telegram, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warn MacArthur to prepare to evacuate Korea and allow the Communists to take the peninsula. MacArthur, who had had to evacuate the Philippines in World War II, was in favor of no new evacuation, and the second document is his response to the Joint Chiefs.
Joint Chiefs of Staff telegram to General Douglas MacArthur, December 1950.
Chinese Communists now appear, from estimates available, capable of forcing evacuation by forces of UN.... In the face of increased threat of general war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe commitments of additional United States ground forces in Korea should not be made, since our view is that major war should not be fought in Korea.
Not considered practicable to obtain at this time significant additional forces from other United Nations. Therefore, in light of present situation, your basic directive, of furnishing to the Republic of Korea assistance as necessary to repel armed attack and restore to the area security and peace, is now modified. Your directive now is to defend in successive positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible.
In view of continued threat to safety of Japan, and possibility of forced withdrawal from Korea, it is important to make advance determination of last reasonable opportunity for orderly evacuation. It appears here that if Chinese Communists retain capability of forcing evacuation after having driven UN forces to rear, it would be necessary to direct commencement of your withdrawal. Request your views on conditions which should determine evacuation. You should consider your mission of defending Japan and limitation on troops available to you...
For the present this message which has been handled with ultimate security should be known only to your chief of staff and to Ridgway and his chief of staff.
General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1950
Should a policy determination be reached by our government or through it by the United Nations to recognize the state of war which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities, and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we could: (1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist Chinese garrison in Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.
I believe that by the foregoing measures we could severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it....
It must be borne in mind that evacuation of our forces in Korea under any circumstances would at once release the bulk of the Chinese forces now absorbed by that campaign for action elsewhere—quite probably in areas of far greater importance than Korea itself....
I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else.
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As 1951 began, Truman and his Pentagon staff continued to warn MacArthur that he would not be allowed to attack China—not by land, sea, or air. MacArthur told a number of people that the president's policy was misguided. Truman warned MacArthur not to express his dissent publicly. On April 5, however, Congressman Joseph Martin made public a letter he had received from MacArthur. The letter contained scathing attacks on Truman's Asia policy, and on his military strategy.
Truman then relieved MacArthur of his command, and in the next document below Truman explains the general's removal to the American people. When MacArthur returned home he was given a ticker tape parade, and Congress invited him to address a joint session. The final document printed here contains part of the text of MacArthur's so-called farewell address.
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Truman's Radio Address to the American People, April 11, 1951.
I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war. I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action....
We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.
But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why can't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?
If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent. If we were to do these things we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.
What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than to have our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?
...We know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.
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Douglas MacArthur's Address to Congress, April 19, 1951.
There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, Europe and Asia, that we cannot divide our efforts. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.
The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe....
I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed proudly that Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-bye.
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Many writers have stated that the sacking of MacArthur was Truman's finest hour. By daring to fire an extremely popular general, Truman stood up for the principle that in our democracy, the civilians control the military. Yet MacArthur showed greatness here as well. Rather than continue to snipe at Truman and at Truman's policies, MacArthur accepted his dismissal while expressing public respect for the president. MacArthur's actions after his firing helped smooth over what could have been a terribly divisive event in American history.
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| © 1999 by Stephen Cresswell |